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I. INTRODUCTION
As China grows in power in the global economy, 1 the need to address
endemic corruption within the government has become increasingly important.
Chinese officials regard corruption as one of the greatest threats to China’s
growing economy and the political stability of the Communist Party
of China (CPC). 2 The indirect costs of corruption, including efficiency
losses of goods and services, and damage to the environment and public
health, are incalculable.3 In 2013, China ranked 80th out of 177 countries
and territories in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index and scored 40 points on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very
clean).4 Transparency International’s Bribe Payer’s Index for 2011 ranks
China 27th out of 28 among the world’s leading economies.5
The nature and development of corruption in China is deeply rooted in
its culture and relates back to the Confucian concept of social hierarchy,6
as well as in the social and cultural practices based on guanxi.7 Directly
translated to mean “relationship,” guanxi describes special relationships
that often extend beyond personal connections and can be more influential
than laws and rules.8 Guanxi relationships can develop through mutual
interests or common goals, and cultivate through activities such as giftgiving.9 The emphasis on relationships, especially in the business context,
can ultimately lead to bribery and corruption as businesses and government
officials seek to exploit their networks to gain private advantages. 10
Similarly, Confucianism defines individuals by their families and
interconnections within a social network.11 Businesses in traditional Chinese
1. See WAYNE M. MORRISSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33534, China’s Economic
RISE: HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1, 37–
38 (2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf.
2. Id. at 37.
3. Minxin Pei, Corruption Threatens China’s Future, Policy Brief No. 55, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, 5 (Oct. 2007), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb55_
pei_china_corruption_final.pdf.
4. Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY I NT ’ L , http://www.
transparency.org/cpi2013/results (last visited Oct. 2, 2014) (stating that almost 70% of countries
scored below 50 out of 100).
5. Deborah Hardoon & Finn Heinrich, Bribe Payers Index 2011, TRANSPARENCY
INT’L 5 (2011), https://www.transparency.org/bpi2011/results.
6. See generally Patricia Pattison & Daniel Herron, The Mountains Are High and
the Emperor Is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract in China, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 478–79
(2003).
7. See Micaela Tucker, “Guanxi!”-“Gesundheit!” an Alternative View on the “Rule
of Law” Panacea in China, 35 VT. L. REV. 689, 693 (2011).
8. Id. at 694–95.
9. Id. at 696–97.
10. See id. at 698–700.
11. Pattinson, supra note 6, at 483.
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culture, consequently, did not operate independently of family and social
relationships.12 Since these types of relationships often took precedent over
contractual ones, preserving and maintaining connections within a community
was important in order to gain benefits and privileges.13
Since taking office in 2013, President Xi Jinping has emphasized the
importance of enforcing his campaign against corruption.14 The number
of bribery convictions issued in recent years and the possibility of receiving
the death penalty for serious corruption-related crimes underscores the
seriousness with which the CPC considers corruption.15 The penalties for
bribery are harsh compared to most other countries and serve as a strong
method of deterrence.
Part II of this Article discusses the PRC’s anti-corruption laws in the
individual and commercial contexts and note the inherent problems in the
CPC’s enforcement efforts. Part III will discuss the impact of these provisions
on China’s economy, on China’s rule of law, and on foreign businesses.
Part IV will provide recommendations on how China can enhance its anticorruption enforcement efforts and improve transparency of its laws, taking
cues from the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the U.K.
Bribery Act. Part V will conclude by explaining why China should join the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) AntiBribery Convention to guarantee implementation of its laws.
II. ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Two separate sets of laws, PRC Criminal Law (“Criminal Law”)16 and
the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China
(AUCL),17 create the framework for China’s anti-corruption laws. The
12. Id.
13. Id. at 486.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See Ji Zhebu, Crime and Punishment for Corrupt Officials, CHINA DAILY (Aug.
29, 2013, 7:26 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-08/29/content_16929435.htm.
16.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中华人民共和国刑法) [hereinafter Criminal
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., on July
1, 1997, effective Mar. 14, 1997), arts. 163–64, 385–93, P.R.C. LAWS, http://www.cecc.gov/
resources/legal-provisions/criminal-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.
17. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Bu Zheng Dang Jing Zheng Fa
(中华人民共和国反不正当竞争法) [Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic
of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Sept. 2,
1993), art. 8, P.R.C. LAWS, http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/prc-unfaircompetition-law-english-and-chinese-text.
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AUCL addresses commercial bribery, while the Criminal Law addresses
both official bribery and commercial bribery.18 Additionally, to comply
with the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)
requirements,19 the PRC amended the Criminal Law to prohibit bribery of
foreign officials.20
These anti-corruption provisions prohibit state functionaries,21 stateowned entities, non-state entities, and employees from taking advantage of
their positions to demand bribes or illegally accept bribes to secure benefits
for the briber.22 They also prohibit individuals from receiving illegitimate
benefits by giving bribes to state functionaries, state-owned entities, nonstate entities, and employees, or from receiving improper commercial
benefits through bribing foreign functionaries or officials of international
public organizations.23 Furthermore, individuals may not give and accept
rebates or service charges while conducting economic activities.24 Another
set of disciplinary rules issued by the CPC Central Committee in 2010
provide guidelines for CPC leaders and cadres to follow.25 Prohibited activities
include accepting cash or financial instruments as gifts, engaging in profitmaking activities, and taking advantages of their positions to receive
illegitimate gains.26
Criminal penalties for parties accepting bribes (the “demand side”) are
generally harsher than those for parties giving bribes, and fall within the

18. See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, arts. 163–64.
19. See G.A. Res. 58/4, United Nations Convention against Corruption, art. 16 (Oct.
31, 2003) [hereinafter UNCAC].
20. See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, art. 164.
21. Id. art. 93 (“Persons who perform public service in State-owned companies or,
enterprises, institutions or people’s organizations, persons who are assi gned by State
organs, State-owned companies, enterprises or institutions to companies, enterprises or
institutions that are not owned by the State or people’s organizations to perform public
service and the other persons who perform public service according to law shall all be
regarded as State functionaries.”).
22. See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, arts. 163,
385–88; Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra note
17, art. 8.
23. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, arts. 163–64,
389–93; Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra note
17, art. 8.
24. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, arts. 163, 387,
389, 391, 393; Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra
note 17, art. 8.
25. Chinese Communist Party Issues Code of Ethics to Ensure Clean Governance,
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 23, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/201002/23/c_13184967.htm (stating that the Central Committee updated the Code of Ethics for CPC
Leaders and Cadres on Clean Government on February 2010).
26. Id.
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Criminal Law.27 Notably, foreign official bribery cases seem to punish
only the party that provides the bribe (the “supply side”).28 For individuals
accepting bribes, these sanctions include fines, criminal detention, fixedterm imprisonment, confiscation of property, and in the most serious
circumstances, the death penalty.29 State-owned organizations and companies
convicted of bribery are subject to fines, and the employees who are
directly responsible for the crime are subject to fixed-term imprisonment
or criminal detention.30 Cases that fall within the AUCL are generally less
severe, subjecting them only to administrative penalties31 and confiscation
of illegal income.32
The Supreme People’s Court33 and Supreme People’s Procuratorate34
have recently clarified and expanded upon bribery enforcement, focusing
on the penalties for bribe-givers.35 The guidance establishes monetary
thresholds for individual bribes to state officials, grading various ranges
of payments from “serious circumstances” of bribery to “major loss to
national interest” and pairing respective penalties for each offense.36 It
also expands the scope of “improper benefits” in bribery offenses to
include “violating principles of fairness and justice to gain a competitive
advantage [in] economic, organizational personnel management or other
activity.”37 One other notable section of the interpretation provides that
any individual or corporate entity accused of bribery who voluntarily
27. Spencer S. Griffith & Yuanming Wang, Chinese Anti-Bribery Law: An Overview of
the Chinese Laws and Their Importance to Foreign Companies Doing Business in China
—Part I, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Aug. 2010, at 11, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/
pdf/2010/August/11.pdf.
28. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, art. 164.
29. Id. arts. 163–64, 383, 386.
30. Id. art. 387.
31. Griffith & Wang, supra note 27.
32. Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra note
17, art. 22.
33. The Supreme People’s Court is the highest judicial court in China. XIANFA § 7,
art. 127 (2004) (China), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_
1372991.htm.
34. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate is the highest agency in China that exercises
and supervises prosecutorial authority at all state and local levels. Id. § 7, art. 132.
35. See The Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate
Interpretation on Several Issues Regarding the Specific Application of Law in Handling
Criminal Cases of Bribery (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. and Sup. People’s Proc.,
effective Jan. 1, 2013) (China), http://chinalawtranslate.com/en/spc-spp-interpretation-onbribery-crimes.
36. Id. arts. 1–4.
37. Id. art. 12.
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confesses before prosecution begins may potentially receive a reduced
punishment or a waiver of punishment.38 The individual or entity may also
receive some leniency if it truthfully confesses to bribery post-prosecution.39
A. Bribery of Officials
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the CPC
regulates and enforces Party discipline.40 The committee has the authority
to implement anti-corruption policies, examine corruption cases, and punish
corrupt members,41 but the most it can do is expel officials from the CPC.42
The CCDI operates outside of the legal system, so it does not require
investigators to obtain warrants before seizing evidence.43 Furthermore, it
has the power to imprison and interrogate any Party official.44
Since China’s current president, Xi Jinping, launched his anti corruption campaign in late 2012,45 the country has seen unprecedented
targeting of government officials. The CCDI investigated approximately
182,000 party members in 2013 alone46 and disciplined 62,953 officials
from January to May 2014, an increase of 34.7% over the same period in
2013.47 The CPC further stressed its focus on curbing corruption by
establishing a five-year (2013-2017) plan to build a system to punish and
prevent corruption.48 The plan calls for more severe punishments and
emphasizes dealing with cases that involve power-for-money deals, judicial
38. Id. art. 7.
39. Id. art. 8.
40. Information Office of the State Council of China, China’s Efforts to Combat
Corruption and Build a Clean Government (White Paper), EMBASSY OF CHINA IN THE
REPUBLIC OF INDIA (Dec. 12, 2010), http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/xwfw/xxfb/t782350.htm.
41. Id.
42. William Wan, Secretive Agency Leads Most Intense Anti-Corruption Effort in
Modern Chinese History, WASH. POST, July 2, 2014, available at http://www.washington
post.com/world/asia_pacific/secretive-agency-leads-most-intense-anti-corruption-effort-inmodern-chinese-history/2014/07/02/48aff932-cf68-11e3-937f-d3026234b51c_story.html.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Upon taking the Party leadership, President Xi Jingping vowed to catch both
“tigers” and “flies”—both powerful and lowly officials. Andrew Jacobs, China Presses
Crackdown Against Graft, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
04/22/world/asia/china-expands-crackdown-on-anticorruption-activists.html.
46. Linling Wei & Bob Davis, ‘Shock and Awe’: Meet China’s Top Enforcer, WALL
S T . J., Aug. 21, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-top-graft-buster-probingthousands-1408588202.
47. Russell Leigh Moses, To No End: Why China’s Corruption Crackdown Won’t
Be Stopping Soon, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/
07/21/to-no-end-why-chinas-corruption-crackdown-wont-be-stopping-soon/.
48. 2013-2017 Work Plan for Establishing and Completing Systems for The
Punishment and Prevention of Corruption (promulgated by the 18th Nat’l Cong. of the
CPC), http://chinalawtranslate.com/en/2013-2017-anti-corruption-plan/.
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corruption, major violations of political discipline, corruption-induced
mass incidents, commercial bribery, and official selection.49
Furthermore, President Xi is specifically targeting Party officials by
passing regulations. For example, the anti-extravagance campaign prohibits
officials from spending public money on luxury goods, and accepting
expensive gifts.50 This campaign attempts to combat the increasing wealth
gap, diminish the appearance of official corruption in the country, and
eliminate lavish gift-giving as a form of bribery.51 The CPC is also attempting
to impede formation of illegal deals between officials and business
executives by advising them to refrain from inherently personal activities,
such as vacationing with other party members, playing mahjong52 and
poker, and spending public money on “study visits” to famous attractions.53
Additionally, to ensure that only those loyal to the party will manage them,
the CPC will cut the salaries of top executives at some of China’s largest
state-owned companies at the end of 2014.54 These executives will also
lose other benefits, such as golf-club memberships, gym memberships,
and physical therapy cards.55 Moreover, the CPC has extended its efforts
to locate and capture several corrupt officials and suspects who have fled
the country.56
The investigations of China’s most high-ranking officials, including Bo
Xilai, Liu Tienan, Xu Caihou, and Zhou Yongkang, signify the CPC’s
determination to eliminate corruption. The CPC sentenced Bo Xilai, a retired
party chief of Chongqing, to life in prison for bribe-taking, embezzlement,

49. See China Focus: China Maintains Pressure with 5-year Anticorruption Plan,
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 25, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201312/26/c_132996415.htm.
50. Laura Burkitt, China’s Frugality Fight Claims New Casualties, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
6, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/02/06/local-figures-tv-ads-take-hit-fromcorruption-push/.
51. See id.
52. Chun Han Wong, Chinese Communist Party Members Urged to Abstain from
Mahjong, Other ‘Small Thrills,’ WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinareal
time/2014/10/28/chinese-communist-party-members-urged-to-abstain-from-mahjong-othersmall-thrills (defining mahjong as a tile-based game commonly played by four players).
53. See id.
54. Linling Wei & Bob Davis, China’s Assault on Corruption Enters Executive
Suite, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2014), available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-assaulton-corruption-enters-executive-suite-1414345082.
55. Id.
56. See 88 nailed in China’s int’l manhunt for fugitives, CHINADAILY.COM (Sept.
21, 2014), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-09/21/content_18634312.htm.
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and abuse of power.57 It also sentenced Liu Tienan, former deputy director
of the National Development and Reform Commission and former head
of the National Energy Administration, to life in prison58 after he admitted
at trial to accepting millions of dollars in bribes.59 The CPC Political Bureau
expelled Xu Caihou, the retired vice-chairman of China’s Central Military
Commission, from the CPC for accepting bribes for himself and through
family members, and using his position to promote others.60 Most recently,
the CPC arrested Zhou Yongkang, a retired domestic security chief and
formerly one of China’s top nine leaders, in late 2014 for leaking state
secrets and taking advantage of his position for financial gain.61 The most
notable aspect of these investigations is that the CPC is targeting senior
officials who previously enjoyed de facto immunity. 62 By investigating
Zhou Yongkang, the CPC rejected the decades-old unwritten rule that
exempted incumbent and retired Politburo Standing Committee63 members
from investigation for corruption.64 However, prosecution of these members
will still require approval of the incumbent Standing Committee. 65
While the Party tries corruption cases in court, the judiciary does not
engage in independent decision making due to the construction of the
judiciary and the CPC’s absolute power.66 The hierarchical structure of
the judiciary permits Party-leaders or court-leaders to instruct a subordinate

57. Michael Wines, In Rise and Fall of Chinese Boss, a Ruthless Arc, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2012, at A1; see also Edward Wong, China: Court Rejects Appeal By Fallen Chinese
Official, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2013, at A6.
58. See Josh Chin, China Sentences Liu Tienan to Life in Prison, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
10, 2014), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-sentences-liu-tienan-to-life-inprison-xinhua-says-1418179307.
59. See James Areddy, World News: Chinese Ex-Official Admits to Corruption,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2014, at A16.
60. See An Baijie, Top-level General Expelled for Graft, CHINADAILY.COM (July 1,
2014), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-07/01/content_17627820.htm.
61. See James T. Areddy, China’s Communist Party Ejects Former Security Chief
Zhou, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5 2014), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-communistparty-ejects-former-security-chief-zhou-1417798750.
62. Minxin Pei, Opinion, Crony Communism in China, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/18/opinion/crony-communism-in-china.html.
63. Id.
64. See Benjamin Kang Lim & Ben Blanchard, China’s Ex-Security Chief Helping
Probe, Not Target: Sources, REUTERS (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2013/09/04/us-china-politics-idUSBRE9830D220130904.
65. Id.
66. Walking on Thin Ice: Control, Intimidation and Harassment of Lawyers in
China, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2008) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch], http://www.
hrw.org/reports/2008/china0408/5.htm (statement of former SPC President Xio Yang)
(“The power of the courts to adjudicate independently doesn’t mean at all independence
from the Party. It is the opposite, the embodiment of a high degree of responsibility vis-àvis Party undertakings.”).
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judge to rule on a case in a specific way.67 This decision-making mechanism
can allow the personal preferences of a leader or judge to prevail without
regard to legal interpretation and adjudication.68 Since these subordinate
judges are required to follow the chief decision-maker’s instruction, they
are forced to either misrepresent the fact-finding process or the meaning
of the law to support the predetermined outcome of a case, thus undermining
the independence of both the judiciary and the rule of law.69 As a result,
application of this practice has perpetuated a form of corruption within
the judicial system.70
The underlying reason for this approach lies within the principle of the
“leadership of the Communist Party.”71 Historically, the CPC has opposed
the idea of an independent judiciary72 and has maintained unchallenged
rule over China.73 Furthermore, because the CPC is concerned with its
reputation, 74 it will heavily censor information released to the public
regarding corrupt Party members to avoid the possibility of humiliating
the regime.75 A related risk to the CPC in accusing a state official of
bribery is that it may also implicate other Party members. Thus, any sensitive
information concerning past investigations is kept under tight supervision
and requires special clearance for access.76 For these reasons, corruption
cases begin with a pre-investigation phase which can only proceed to an
official investigation if the high-ranking Party leaders, including members
of the Standing Committee, approve it.77 However, by the time it reaches
that stage, a finding of guilt is often inevitable and the CPC has essentially
67. See Ling Li, The “Production” of Corruption in China’s Courts, 38 USALI (2011),
http://usali.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/The-production-of-corruption-in-Chinas-courts.pdf.
68. See id. at 40.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., CPC Names Corrupt Judicial Officials, CHINADAILY.COM (Sept. 29,
2014), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-09/29/content_18682687.htm.
71. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 66.
72. Id.
73. SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41007,
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM 14 (2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ R41007.pdf.
74. F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Jill M. Pfenning, FCPA Compliance
in China and the Gifts and Hospitality Challenge, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 33, 41 (2010),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Warin-Diamant-FCPAComplianceIn
China.pdf.
75. Id.
76. William Wan, How the Secretive, Powerful Agency in Charge of Investigating
Corrupt Chinese Officials Works, WASH. POST (July 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/07/03/how-the-communist-party-investigates-its-own/.
77. Id.
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decided the disposition of the case.78 As a result of censorship and secrecy,
the courts and Party, more motivated by politics, often do not fairly
adjudicate corruption cases involving Party officials.
Political motivations may also help explain why rampant corruption
still exists despite the widespread publication of corruption cases.79 In the
past decade, the CPC’s focus on capturing high-ranking individuals resulted
because of internal power struggles and economic concerns.80 The Party
often targeted members of competing factions to weaken political rivals
and their corporate supporters.81 For example, the CPC convicted four
employees of Rio Tinto, a British-Australian mining company, of bribery
charges in 2009.82 The Rio Tinto investigation was alleged to have been
politically motivated because the company was competing with the
government’s steel industry over iron ore prices.83 In the present context,
many believe President Xi also had political motives to arrest Zhou
Yongkang because Zhou worked closely with Bo Xilai—Xi’s political
adversary.84 However, the incentives behind President Xi’s anti-corruption
drive remain unclear because the campaign still remains a high priority,85
despite the fact that he has already captured and punished several highranking political enemies.
B. Compliance with the UNCAC
The UNCAC has 140 signatories and 172 parties,86 and it seeks to combat
corruption by encouraging cooperation between participating countries
and maintaining the ideals of fairness, responsibility, and equality.87 The
main goals of the Convention are prevention, criminalization, international
cooperation, and asset recovery.88 Member states are required to criminalize

78. Id.
79. See David Barboza, Politics Permeates Anti-Corruption Drive in China, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/business/global/04corrupt.html.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Andrew Browne, Elites Tremble as Xi Cleans House, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5,
2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/elites-tremble-as-xi-cleans-house-1407222978.
85. See Highlights of Communique of 4th Plenary Session of CPC Central
Committee, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 23, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
china/2014-10/23/c_133737957.htm.
86. UNCAC Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 September 2014, U.N. OFFICE
ON DRUGS AND CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last
visited Oct. 14, 2014).
87. UNCAC, supra note 19, at preamble.
88. Id.
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the bribery of national and foreign public officials89 and to establish sanctions
proportional to the seriousness of the bribery offense.90
The Convention requires member nations to develop a “comprehensive
and multidisciplinary approach” to prevent and correct corruption.91 Each
party must also develop “effective, proportionate, and dissuasive criminal
and non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.”92 Since the
UNCAC Conference of the States Parties did not discuss the topic of
implementation in initial negotiations,93 it therefore grants its members a
large degree of discretion on the method of implementation and
enforcement of the Convention’s requirements in their national laws. 94
Thus, while China has indeed amended its criminal law to conform to the
requirements of the UNCAC, it has approached the implementation process
rather cautiously and independently.95 The country’s belief that implementation
should only be assessed by the government itself contrasts with many
Western countries’ advocacy of both peer and expert review.96 The CPC
is reluctant to engage in peer review most likely because it fears that it
may uncover even greater deficiencies within the government and thereby
expose how truly pervasive corruption actually is in PRC.97
C. Commercial Bribery
The AUCL provides the primary legal framework for administrative
liability and commercial bribery, and prohibits transactions in which a
business operator gives the recipient a bribe in order to obtain business or
some other illegitimate business benefit.98 The AUCL also proscribes the
use of off-the-books kickbacks to secure a sale.99 The Criminal Law
89. Id. arts. 15–16.
90. Id. art. 30.
91. Id. at preamble.
92. Id. art. 26.
93. Margaret K. Lewis, Corruption: Spurring China to Engage in International
Law, China Rts. F., no. 1 90, 91 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1432467.
94. Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Global
Achievement or Missed Opportunity?, 8 J. I NT ’ L ECON . L. 191, 221 (2005), http://
pustakahpi.kemlu.go.id/dir_dok/UNCAC-Global-Achievement-or-Missed-Opportunity.pdf.
95. Lewis, supra note 93, at 92.
96. Id. at 91.
97. Id. at 92.
98. See Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra
note 17, art. 8.
99. Id.
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proscribes giving employees of companies, enterprises or other entities
bribes for the purpose of obtaining unlawful benefits. 100 The AUCL
provisions treat corruption cases differently from the Criminal Law because
it does not set any thresholds for the monetary value of bribes involved
and encompasses a broader scope of activities.101
The State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and countylevel and above Administrations for Industry and Commerce (AICs) enforce
the AUCL.102 The AICs conduct special enforcement campaigns to shut
down public enterprises and other monopolized businesses that abuse their
monopoly positions to conduct coercive transactions.103 Additionally, the
AICs seek to prevent, investigate, and conduct cases where local governments
and their departments abuse their administrative powers to eliminate or
restrict competition.104 These agencies do not regularly publish decisions
about AUCL violations, but occasional SAIC press releases and a book of
select anti-monopoly cases published by the SAIC provide at least some
insight into enforcement practices under the AUCL.105
There has been an increased emphasis on enforcement against commercial
bribery in response to the business culture in China, particularly in the
pharmaceutical industry.106 After China began overhauling its healthcare
industry in 2009, many multinational pharmaceutical companies have come
under scrutiny.107 The leading case in this matter is GlaxoSmithKline’s
(GSK) investigation and its subsequent conviction for bribery.108 Following
allegations of widespread bribery in June 2013, GSK’s former China
executive, Mark Reilly, hired investigator Peter Humphrey and his wife
Yu Yingzeng to conduct an internal investigation, but the corporate

100. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, art. 164.
101. See generally Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of
China, supra note 17 (illustrating that the AUCL prohibits bribery by “other means,” but
neither explicitly defines this term nor provides examples).
102. H. STEPHEN HARRIS, JR. ET. AL., ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA
333, 344 (2011).
103. Id. at 333.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Laurie Burkitt, China Raises the Heat on Glaxo: State News Outlets Run
Reports Saying Pressure to Sell Led to Corruption at Drug Maker, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3,
2013, at A.18.
107. See Lauren Burkitt, China: A Risky Bet for Drug Makers, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21,
2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/10/21/china-an-increasingly-risky-bet-for-drugmakers/.
108. See Laurie Burkitt & Jeanne Whalen, China Targets Big Pharma; GlaxoSmithKline
Hit With Bribery Allegations as Health-Care Sector Soars, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323664204578607502156860618.
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investigators found no evidence of corruption or bribery.109 Chinese officials
began a separate investigation one month later and accused GSK’s senior
executives of using travel agencies to offer kickbacks to government
officials, hospitals, and doctors to sell more drugs at higher prices. 110
After a secret one-day trial, the court imposed a fine of approximately
$500 million on the company and sentenced five of GSK’s company
managers, including Reilly, to potential prison terms of up to four years
for bribing nongovernmental officials.111 GSK made a statement taking
full responsibility of its actions, but did not make a statement regarding
bribery of government personnel due to the sensitivity of the topic.112 The
CPC will expel Reilly, a British national, from China after his four-year
suspended prison sentence.113 The court gave Reilly a more lenient sentence
because he voluntarily returned to China, assisted with the investigation
and confessed to bribery.114
III. IMPACT OF ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS IN CHINA
Attempts to quell government spending by officials have had an
unintended effect on China’s economy, and the inconsistent practices of
regulatory agencies have deterred many foreign companies from considering
investing in China. Moreover, increasing public distrust with the CPC has
forced the Party to consider developing a truly independent judiciary to
demonstrate that it is providing a fair adjudication process for those
accused of bribery. Lastly, the vague anti-corruption laws and unchecked
power of the CCDI have dissuaded foreign countries from assisting China
in capturing officials who have fled to those countries.

109. Hester Plumridge, GlaxoSmithKline Found Guilty of Bribery in China U.K.
Drug Maker Handed Largest Ever Corporate Fine in China, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/glaxosmithkline-found-guilty-of-bribery-in-china-1411114817.
110. David Barboza, Glaxo Used Travel Firms For Bribery, China Says, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2013, at B1.
111. Keith Bradsher & Chris Buckely, China Fines GlaxoSmithKline Nearly $500
Million in Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/
business/international/gsk-china-fines.html.
112. Id.
113. Plumridge, supra note 109.
114. Id.
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A. China’s Economy
The CPC’s campaigns to reduce extravagance and waste have caused
the luxury industry to suffer in China.115 According to an annual luxury
goods study, growth in China’s luxury market has slowed from 7% in
2012 to 2% in 2013.116 The ban on giving and receiving gifts has
eliminated much of the luxury good purchases in China, causing a large
drop in sales particularly for the watch and menswear departments.117 An
estimated 2% drop in China’s luxury goods sales marks the first decline
in sales after over a decade of growth.118 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. sales in
China have declined 1.6% in 2014 from 2013 due to a decreased sale in
gift cards, moon cakes, and other gift-giving goods.119 The food and alcohol
industries have also experienced significant deceleration of growth due to
cuts on lavish spending, and five-star hotels have voluntarily demoted
themselves to four-stars to appear less luxurious.120
Officials have significantly reduced government spending on receptions,
travel, and vehicles, and the number of officials traveling overseas has
been cut by 44% in 2013.121 Fear of corruption has also prevented many
officials from spending government money on new projects. 122 The
reduction of Party officials’ benefits and the risk of corruption accusations
has also triggered several officials to leave their government positions for
the private sector.123 Thus far, the CPC has accused over 30,000 officials

115. He Wei, Luxury Market Cooling Down, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/18/c_132976573.htm.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Manuela Mesco, Luxury Goods Sales Set to Fall in Russia and China, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 14, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/luxury-goods-sales-set-to-fall-in-russiaand-china-1413296208.
119. Laurie Burkitt, Wal-Mart Feels Pinch From China Austerity Campaign:
Executive Cites Drop in Sales of Gift Cards and Goods Tied to Culture of Gift Giving,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/wal-mart-says-china-sales-hurtby-nations-austerity-campaign-1415550596.
120. Adam Taylor, No More Shark Fins, Whiskey and Prada: The Strange Signs of
China’s corruption Crackdown, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/04/09/no-more-shark-fins-whiskey-and-prada-the-strangesigns-of-chinas-corruption-crackdown/.
121. James T. Areddy, New Frugality Puts Strain on Chinese Firms: Anticorruption
Campaign Dashes Peak Holiday Sales, WALL. ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702304027204579334162357059046.
122. John Sudworth, The Real Costs of China’s Anti-corruption Crackdown, BBC
NEWS: CHINA BLOG (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-26864134.
123. Wei Gu, Chinese Officials Are Fleeing the Public Sector for the Private:
Anticorruption Campaign Has Led to Fewer Perks at Government Jobs, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
4, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinese-officials-are-fleeing-the-public-sectorfor-the-private-sector-1409835345.
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of violating the frugality regulation, but punished only about a quarter of
them.124
China’s GDP growth slowed down to 7.4%, its lowest level in 18
months, in the first quarter of 2014 due to decreased investment and
consumption.125 The reduction is a result of China’s attempt to restructure
its economy, as well as the reduction of investment and luxury goods
sales.126 Bank of America Merrill Lynch predicts that the anti-corruption
drive will cost more than $100 billion in 2014, and will have burdensome
economic impacts.127 Luxury spending prohibitions could subtract 0.6%
to 1.5% from GDP growth by the end of 2014.128
B. Foreign Companies
The GSK case marks a milestone for the enforcement of anti-corruption
laws in China against foreign companies. Increased scrutiny within the
pharmaceutical industry could also lead to inquiries within other commercial
industries as well. The case suggests that the CPC requires multinational
companies doing business in China to take precautions to prevent corruption
within their China branches. However, as a result of the absence of SAIC
interpretations and enforcement procedure publications, there are still few
guidelines for corporations to follow to seek compliance with the AUCL.129
Moreover, AIC enforcement practices vary greatly among the different
provinces and even among cases within the same local authority.130 Many
U.S. companies find it difficult to conduct business in China because rules
and regulations generally are neither consistent nor transparent, and the
judicial system is not entirely independent.131 Widespread corruption in
China thus creates the unintended result of limiting competition and

124. Areddy, supra note 121.
125. Mark Magnier, China GDP Growth Slows to 7.4%, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303663604579504400644326182.
126. Id.
127. John Sudworth, The Real Costs of China’s Anti-Corruption Crackdown, BBC.COM
(Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-26864134.
128. Id.
129. HARRIS ET. AL., supra note 102, at 362.
130. Lei Li, Anti-Commercial Bribery Laws in China and Their Enforcement in the
Pharmaceutical Company, 2 Bloomberg L. Rep. no. 11, 2010, at 4, http://www.sidley.com/
files/Publication/acb54f59-1ed7-4b03-aa45-89295b99a2d6/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/4231337d-e8d1-4764-a2a0-8b4be13f5fc1/sidley_lei_li_article.pdf.
131. See MORRISSON, supra note 1, at 31.
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undermines the efficient allocation of goods and services in the economy.132
Moreover, government officials often do not enforce anti-corruption laws
and regulations, so companies do not have any incentive to comply with
industry regulations.133
In addition to concerns over the clarity of anti-corruption laws, international
businesses believe China is unfairly targeting foreign companies.134 A
survey conducted by the American Chamber of Commerce in China
revealed that 60% of companies feel less welcome in China, and 49% of
companies believe China is targeting foreign firms.135 The lack of transparency
in enforcement efforts has caused many foreign companies to look less
favorably upon China as an investment destination.136
The rising number of anti-corruption investigations also means that
multinational companies under investigation will need to consider the
possibility of handling parallel investigations of conduct by China and the
entity’s home country. 137 Companies may also need to reevaluate the
strength and thoroughness of investigation standards within the company
because they may not sufficiently meet China’s standards.138 Finally, as
the media discloses more investigations, foreign companies may need to
update their own programs to reflect industry-specific rules.
C. China’s Rule of Law
The powerful, yet secretive CCDI and the CPC-controlled judicial
system are emblematic of the relative lack of rule of law in China.
Widespread corruption in the judiciary during Zhou Yongkang’s period
in office as domestic security chief meant that the CPC’s main priority
was stability maintenance, not adherence to the rule of law.139 Zhou’s
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Andrew Browne & Laurie Burkitt, U.S. Firms Feel Unwelcome in China, According
to Survey; U.S. Companies Say They Have Become Targets of China’s Antimonopoly and
Anticorruption Campaigns, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-sfirms-feel-less-welcome-in-china-1409624607.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Henry Chen, Pharma Bribe Probe Points to China Parallel Prosecutions,
FCPA BLOG (July 11, 2013, 2:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/7/11/pharmabribe-probe-points-to-china-parallel-prosecutions.html.
138. See Christopher Matthews & Jessica Hodgson, GlaxoSmithKline Probes Bribe
Allegations in China, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424127887324798904578529413574312372 (discussing that GSK performed its own
investigations before China stepped in, but found no evidence of bribery with respect to
payments to doctors in China).
139. James T. Areddy, Anticorruption Agency Gains Power in China, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
17, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/anticorruption-agency-gains-power-in-china-141359
0068.
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capture indicates how deeply ingrained corruption is within the Chinese
government, but also demonstrates President Xi’s commitment to eradicating
it.
Thus far, the anti-corruption drive has focused on targeting and
punishing high-ranking individuals. The process by which the CCDI
investigates officials, termed “shang-gui,”140 provides no due process and
instills fear in Party members. While the CCDI’s focus on harsh punishments
for corruption undeniably deters officials from accepting bribes and solves
some existing problems, the CPC must take stronger efforts to prevent the
reemergence of corruption. Party officials want to comply with existing
laws, but the lack of clarity of anti-bribery laws imposes unnecessary
pressure on them.141
SPC President Zhou Qiang acknowledged the existing issues in the
judicial system at the 12th National People’s Congress.142 He expressed
interest in creating a more independent judiciary and preventing Party
officials from influencing court decisions in order to protect the credibility
of the court.143 However, another problem lies in the fact that judges are
appointed by local officials,144 so regardless of whether officials interfere
in decisions, judges may rule in favor of those officials due to Party
loyalty. China has made prior judicial reform efforts in 2012,145 but the
recent charges of judicial corruption emphasize the need for more
improvements and enforcement of the rules.
China’s rule of law was the central theme at the 4th Plenary Session of
the 18th CPC Central Committee, which began on October 20, 2014.146
That meeting further advanced the concept of China’s rule of law under
the CPC leadership147 and introduced experiments to reduce interference
in the judicial system by local officials.148 The Central Committee passed
140. Areddy, supra note 139 (describing “shang-gui” as a process by which the
CCID interrogates suspects for months without providing them access to lawyers).
141. See supra Part III.A.
142. Editorial Board, Opinion, China Rethinks its Judicial System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/opinion/china-rethinks-its-judicial-system.html.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Information Office of the State Council of The People’s Republic of China
Judicial Reform in China, White Paper: Judicial Reform in China (Oct. 2012), http://english.
gov.cn./archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043170.htm.
146. Yang Yi, CPC Sets New Blueprint for Rule of Law, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY
(Oct. 23, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-10/23/c_133737845.htm.
147. Id.
148. Areddy, supra note 139.
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a Decision149 and Communiqué150 following the four-day meeting. Both
reports reiterate the CPC’s control over law and legal institutio ns.151
Another focus of the meeting addresses the problem of extra-judicial
interference by local officials, which has intensified public distrust with the
CPC.152 Proposed solutions include establishing circuit courts that operate
across jurisdictions and directly report to Beijing, thereby transferring
authority over financing and hiring staff from the local courts to the
provincial level, and creating a system for tracking, reporting and punishing
officials who attempt to influence cases.153 Although the reports recognize
the importance of creating an independent judiciary to maintain legitimacy,
they also repeatedly emphasize that the CPC will maintain control over
the legal system154 as a “fundamental requirement” and “basic safeguard”
of China’s rule of law.155 The Party also announced plans to combat corruption
within the military by implementing stricter supervision methods and
reforming its disciplinary scheme.156
D. Developing Cooperation with Foreign Countries
If China wants to capture individuals who have fled overseas, it must
provide clear guidance to show how foreign countries can cooperate with
China’s laws. The opaque character of the CCDI and unfair legal system
pose a problem for Western democracies, which results in an unwillingness
to join forces with China. However, returning assets and fugitives from
overseas is an important goal for the CPC. One study conducted by
149. CPC Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major Questions in
Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the law Forward, CHINA
COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA (Oct. 28, 2014), http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/
2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively
-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/ [hereinafter CPC Central
Committee Decision].
150. Official Central Committee Communiqué on 4th Plenum, CHINA COPYRIGHT
AND MEDIA (Oct. 23, 2014), http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/23/
official-central-committee-communique-on-4th-plenum/.
151. Stanley Lubman, Key Points in China’s Flood of Legal Reform Rhetoric, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/10/30/key-points-in-chinasflood-of-legal-reform-rhetoric/.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. CPC Central Committee Decision, supra note 149 (stating the words “under the
leadership of the Party” several times throughout the Decision).
155. Josh Chin & James T. Areddy, China Vows to Strengthen Judicial System,
WALL S T . J. (Oct. 23, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-vows-to-strengthenjudicial-system-1414065032.
156. Josh Chin & Brian Spegele, China Signals Greater Oversight of Military,
Media, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-signals-greateroversight-of-military-media-1414508534.
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Global Financial Integrity estimated a $2.83 trillion of illegal money
flowed out of China between 2005 and 2011.157 One example of a foreign
country’s reluctance to cooperate with China is the case of Lai Changxi,
one of its most-wanted fugitives who organized a multi-billion dollar
smuggling ring before fleeing to Canada.158 Although officials arrested
Lai in Canada one year after he fled, the Canadian courts had refused to
return him to China for 11 years based on the fear that China’s legal system
could not guarantee Lai a fair trial.159
Consequently, the CPC has a strong motivation to implement transparent
government systems and participate in international cooperation with
other members of the UNCAC, which the Convention requires. Success
in capturing officials and recovering assets will bolster the CPC’s claim
of its legitimacy and deter potential suspects from fleeing the country to
avoid punishment.160
In order to provide incentives for countries to help China track down
corrupt officials who have fled the country with their illegal assets, China
recently adopted a common policy among other countries to share up to
80% of their forfeited assets.161 Most countries require evidence that
illegal assets exist before engaging in asset recovery,162 but this type of
evidence is typically difficult to prove because individuals often launder
these assets in other countries.163 Thus far, Canada and France have agreed
to share forfeited assets with China.164 China has also signed extradition
treaties with 38 countries, but not with Canada, Australia, the United

157. James Pomfret & Matthew Miller, On China’s Border Underground Banking
Flourishes, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/business/
global/on-chinas-border-underground-banking-flourishes.html.
158. See Ian Johnson & Michael Wines, Beijing Arrests Its Most-Wanted Fugitive
After Canada Deports Him, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
07/24/world/asia/24lai.html?_r=0.
159. Id.
160. Lewis, supra note 93, at 93.
161. Cheng Muyang, China to Share Assets from Fugitives Abroad with Other
Countries, CHINADAILY.COM (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201411/03/content_18856312.htm.
162. Id.
163. Chen Heying, China to share up to 80% of assets in global corruption manhunt:
expert, GLOBAL TIMES (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.bjd.com.cn/10beijingnews/focus/201411/
03/t20141103_8185149.html.
164. Hui Zhi, China to Share Fugitives’ assets with Countries assisting the ‘Fox
Hunt,’ FCPA BLOG (Nov. 13, 2014, 6:38 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/
11/13/china-to-share-fugitives-assets-with-countries-assisting-the.html.
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States—three of the most favored places for Chinese fugitives to flee.165
Australia and the United States refuse to extradite anyone convicted of
corruption if there is a possibility that the person will receive the death
penalty.166
The 21 Asia-Pacific nations of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum have also affirmed plans in November 2014 to combat
regional corruption.167 The anti-corruption network, called Act-Net, will
be based in China and will run as a subdivision of the CCDI.168 Designed
to reinforce international agreements such as the UNCAC, Act-Net will
build a cross-border network that promotes communication flow between
law enforcement agencies.169 The countries are “committed to denying
safe haven to those engaged in corruption, including through extradition,
mutual legal assistance, and the recovery and return of proceeds of
corruption.”170
China initially resisted a proposal at the November 2014 G20 summit
designed to facilitate tracing business ownership, but it eventually agreed
to support these transparency measures.171 Under this regime, countries
will share information about the owners of shell companies and trusts
between law enforcement agencies to pinpoint wealthy individuals who
could potentially use those entities to evade taxes, launder money, and
hide corruption.172 China’s promise to disclose that level of information
underscores its resolve to eradicate corruption. These measures will likely
help the CCDI investigate individuals attempting to hide their investments
though shell companies and cross ownership structures.173

165. Id.
166. See Muyang, supra note 161; Fergus Ryan, Australia Considers Extradition
Treaty with China, THE AUSTRALIAN (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/
business/latest/australia-considers-extradition-treaty-with-china/story-e6frg90f-1227118
652294.
167. James T. Areddy, China Set to Host Regional Anticorruption Network, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-set-to-host-regional-anticorruptionnetwork-1415176815.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Daniel Stacy & Rob Taylor, China Reverses Opposition to G-20 Anticorruption
Plan, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-reverses-opposition-tog-20-anticorruption-plan-1416135168.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT UNDER THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND U.K. BRIBERY ACT
Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977174
after a series of scandals in which hundreds of U.S. companies had paid
millions of dollars in bribes to secure business from foreign officials.175
It amended the FCPA twice: once in 1988 to add affirmative defenses.176
and once in 1998 to comply with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s
requirement to include bribery of foreign nationals.177 Generally, the
FCPA consists of anti-bribery provisions which prohibit the offering of
bribes and accounting provisions.178
The United Kingdom passed the Bribery Act in 2010179 to consolidate
and revise its outdated corruption laws, and also to comply with the OECD
Convention requirements. 180 Prior to this Act, the United Kingdom had
utilized a patchwork of anti-bribery legislation dating as far back as 1889.181
The new Bribery Act criminalizes three types of activities: (1) the giving
and receiving of bribes; (2) the bribery of foreign public officials; and (3)
the failure of commercial organizations to prevent bribery.182
The following sections will discuss select aspects of the U.S. and U.K.
anti-corruption systems and recommend that China adopt or look to these
provisions for future anti-corruption efforts. These provisions and enforcement
methods provide for an efficient and balanced focus on bribery, though
they may vary in their methods of accomplishing this goal. Because the
U.S. and U.K. statutes focus on the supply-side of bribery, they complement
174. See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91
Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff, 78m(b),
(d)(1), (g)-(h) (2006 & Supp. 2010)) [hereinafter FCPA].
175. See CRIMINAL DIV. OF DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIV. OF THE SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, 3
(Nov. 14, 2010) [hereinafter FCPA Resource Guide], http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/guidance/guide.pdf.
176. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§§ 5001–5003, 102 Stat. 1415, 1424 (1988).
177. See generally International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-366, §§ 1–6, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998).
178. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 2.
179. See generally Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 [hereinafter Bribery Act], http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/pdfs/ukpga_20100023_en.pdf.
180. Bruce W. Bean & Emma H. MacGuidwin, Unscrewing the Inscrutable: The UK
Bribery Act 2010, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 63, 67–68 (2013).
181. Id.
182. See generally Bribery Act, supra note 179.
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China’s heavy focus on the demand-side and provide ideas that China may
borrow to obtain a balance between both aspects of bribery.
A. Anti-Bribery Provisions Under the FCPA
The FCPA anti-bribery provisions prohibit the offer, payment, promise
to pay, or authorization of payment of anything of value to any foreign
official, foreign political party, official, or candidate, to obtain or retain
business.183 These provisions apply to issuers,184 their employees, U.S.
persons and businesses (“domestic concerns”),185 and certain foreign persons
or businesses.186 Conduct both inside and outside of the U.S. is covered
by the FCPA if issuers or domestic concerns use interstate commerce to
further the corrupt payments to foreign officials.187 Entities other than
issuers or domestic concerns that directly or indirectly engage in any act
in furtherance of a corrupt payment while on U.S. territory are also covered
by the FCPA.188
The Department of Justice (DOJ), Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), and U.S. courts have interpreted the phrase “anything of value” to
cover a broad range of subjects.189 Forms of payment may include cash,
charitable contributions, extravagant gifts, travel and entertainment expenses,
luxuries such as food, travel, meal and lodging expenses, and promises of
future employment.190 While there is no minimum threshold amount for
gifts or payments, the DOJ and SEC have historically focused on minor
payments and gifts only when they are part of a larger and long-standing
scheme of corruption.191 Furthermore, the FCPA does not bar all forms
of gift-giving—only those of a type used to disguise bribes.192
There are two affirmative defenses for the payment, gift, offer, or
promise of anything of value. First, it is an affirmative defense if the laws

183. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a).
184. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (defining this group as including domestic and foreign
companies listed on any U.S. stock exchange or which are required to file reports with the
SEC).
185. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (including any individual who is a U.S. citizen,
national, or resident and any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship, which has its principal
place of business in the United States, or which is organized under U.S. laws).
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(1).
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(5).
188. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a).
189. Sarah Bartle et. al., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1265,
1277 (2014).
190. Id. at 1278; see also FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 15–19.
191. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 15.
192. Id. at 16.
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of the foreign official’s country consider the conduct lawful.193 Second,
a defense exists when the act was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure
incurred on behalf of the foreign official.194 Companies are generally not
subject to enforcement action by the DOJ or SEC if they pay for items of
nominal value,195 but they are encouraged to devise their own compliance
programs and provide guidelines for acceptable gift-giving behavior to
mitigate potential violations.196
B. Anti-Bribery Provisions Under the Bribery Act
One notable difference between the FCPA and the Bribery Act is that
the Bribery Act prohibits both the offer and acceptance of bribes, while
the FCPA prohibits only the offer of bribes. Furthermore, the Bribery Act
has merged both domestic and foreign corruption laws into one statute,197
while the FCPA maintains separate statutes.198 The Bribery Act prohibits
a person from directly or indirectly offering, promising, or givi ng a
financial or other advantage to a foreign public official for the purposes
of obtaining or retaining business or a competitive advantage.199
Corporate entities and their officers are also liable for giving bribes,
regardless of whether the acts take place within the U.K. territory,200 as
long as the organization or its agents have a “close connection” with the
U.K.201 However, it is an affirmative defense if the organization can prove
that it had adequate measures in place to prevent its agent from
undertaking corrupt conduct.202 Under the FCPA, the Secretary of State203
has published guidance on how commercial organizations can implement
procedures to prevent bribery committed on their behalf.204 The following
193. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(c)(1).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(c)(2).
195. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 15 (categorizing items such as cab
fare, reasonable meals and entertainment expenses as likely acceptable gifts).
196. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2011).
197. See generally Bribery Act, supra note 179.
198. See 18 U.S.C. § 201.
199. Bribery Act, supra note 179, § 6.
200. Id. § 12(5).
201. Id. § 14.
202. Id. § 7(2).
203. Id. § 9.
204. See Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010 Guidance, GOV.UK (Mar. 2011),
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-recance.pdf.
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six principles are established: (1) proportionate procedures; (2) top-level
commitment; (3) risk assessment; (4) due diligence; (5) communication
(including training); and (6) monitoring and review.205
C. Recommended Anti-Bribery Provisions in China
Similar to the Bribery Act, the AUCL and PRC Criminal Law prohibit
both the giving and accepting of bribes by domestic individuals and
corporations, and also prohibit the giving of bribes to foreign officials.206
However, unlike the FCPA and Bribery Act, the Criminal Law neither
mentions differences between direct and indirect giving nor criminalizes
the offer of bribes to foreign officials.207 In order to effectively enforce
its laws regarding bribery of foreign officials and conform to domestic
bribery standards,208 the CPC should amend the existing Criminal Law to
include these prohibited activities. Furthermore, it should also amend the
current laws to meet UNCAC standards.209
The Criminal Law’s jurisdictional principles govern foreign official
bribery.210 The SPC and SPP have yet to interpret the provisions governing
extra-territorial jurisdiction, but the provisions appear to apply to Chinese
citizens, entities formed under Chinese law, and possibly even individuals
and entities whose corrupt acts implicate China.211 Adding a provision that
explicitly provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction may benefit China and
encourage other countries to assist in the efforts to track down individuals
who have fled the country.
The FCPA takes note of varying cultural values in its enforcement against
corporate gifts or payments by allowing gifts or payments to foreign
officials if they were reasonable and bona fide expenses, or if they were
lawful under the laws of the foreign country.212 The AUCL currently does
not define the phrase “gift or other means” in relation to commercial bribery,
meaning one can interpret it very broadly to encompass activities that are
illegal in China, but legal in another country.213 With President Xi’s anti205. Id.
206. See supra Part II.
207. See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, art. 164.
208. Id. arts. 392–93, 398 (stating that the domestic bribery provisions prohibit the
“offer” and “introduction” of bribes to state officials).
209. UNCAC, supra note 19, art. 6 (requiring each country to define bribery as “the
promise, offering, or giving to a foreign public official. . .directly or indirectly”).
210. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, arts. 6–8.
211. Samuel R. Gintel, Fighting Transnational Bribery: China’s Gradual Approach,
31 WIS. INT’L L. J. 1, 14–15 (2013).
212. See supra Part IV.A.
213. Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra note
17, art. 8.
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luxury campaign in place, companies and individuals currently do not
spend money out of fear that the CPC will accuse them of corruption.214
China’s economy may benefit from a clearer definition of “gift or other
means,” especially since China has a gift-giving culture that is very
important. This definition would also allow companies to conform to anticorruption provisions while not preventing engagement in normal
business courtesies, such as small gifts of esteem or gratitude.215 Recent
investigations into companies such as GSK could potentially lead to more
judicial interpretations to resolve these vague points in the definition of
commercial bribery.
D. Accounting Provisions Under the FCPA
FCPA accounting provisions require companies to make annual reports,
keep accurate records of its transactions, and create internal accounting
controls.216 These provisions apply to issuers, domestic and foreign
companies listed on any U.S. stock exchange, or those which are required
to file reports with the SEC.217 An issuer must comply with accounting
provisions, regardless of whether it engages in foreign operations or
bribery violations because the records are the main source of accounting
fraud and issuer disclosure cases.218
The FCPA books and records provision requires all issuers to “make and
keep books, records, and accounts, which in reasonable detail, accurately
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the
issuer.”219 The reasonable detail standard is one that would “satisfy prudent
officials in the conduct of their own affairs” and balances numerous relevant
factors, including the cost of compliance.220 The record-keeping and internal
controls provisions also ensures that a company properly uses its assets,
encourages accurate recording of improper payments, and prevents the
mischaracterization of transactions.221

214. See supra Part III.A.
215. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 15.
216. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a).
217. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b).
218. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 38.
219. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
220. H.R. REP. NO. 100-418, at 917 (1988), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/history/1988/tradeact-100-418.pdf.
221. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 39.
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The internal controls provision requires issuers to create internal controls
that reasonably ensure the accurate execution and recording of transactions.222
Companies have the discretion to develop their own controls to meet their
particular needs and circumstances, but must take into consideration the
realities and risks associated with their respective industries.223 The Bribery
Act does not have accounting provisions, but because it holds commercial
organizations liable for the failure to prevent bribery, 224 companies are
encouraged to implement their own record-keeping and internal controls.
E. Recommended Accounting Provisions for China
China’s Criminal Law and AUCL currently have provisions that criminalize
individuals for accepting off-the-book rebates or service charges,225 and
firms for paying kickbacks and accepting discounts without recording
them. 226 However, China should adopt a more comprehensive recordkeeping provision to help a company’s compliance programs become
more effective and ensure that a business accurately records its payments.
Adopting provisions like those of the FCPA will warrant the accountability
of companies and will also provide sufficient evidence for the CCDI to
investigate and prosecute a company.
Additionally, record-keeping provisions create an objective mechanism
for monitoring corruption because a company’s internal investigators may
themselves be corrupt. Providing an affirmative defense like the Bribery
Act for companies that create adequate anti-bribery procedures and bookkeeping measures would encourage companies to report costs truthfully
and aid CCDI investigations. Regardless of whether China decides to
implement these accounting provisions, corporations should still devise
their own internal compliance programs.
F. Enforcement and Penalties Under the FCPA
The DOJ and SEC enforce the FCPA’s provisions together and work
with other federal agencies and law-enforcement partners to enforce
FCPA violations.227 The DOJ has the criminal and civil enforcement
responsibility for U.S. citizens, nationals, residents, and U.S. businesses
and their agents, as well as certain foreign persons and businesses. 228
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
17, at 8.
227.
228.
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FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 40.
Bribery Act, supra note 179, § 7.
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 16, at 387.
Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra note
FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 175, at 4.
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Additionally, the DOJ has criminal enforcement responsibility over issuers
and their agents, while the SEC is responsible for civil enforcement
over issuers and their agents.229 Furthermore, the DOJ maintains a website
that publishes select FCPA-related prosecutions and resolutions, and copies
of opinions issued in response to questions by companies and individuals
that determine whether proposed conduct would be prosecuted under the
FCPA.230 The U.S. government also utilizes the Departments of Commerce
and State to assist U.S. companies doing business abroad with corruption
and bribery-related issues.231 The Department of Commerce has published
guidelines that help corporations comply with anti-corruption laws.232
Most cases of commercial bribery under the FCPA are resolved through
deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) or non-prosecution agreements
(NPAs).233 In order to obtain or qualify for a settlement agreement through
these methods, the DOJ and SEC will consider: (1) a firm’s willingness to
cooperate in the underlying investigation and (2) whether the firm promoted
a “culture of compliance.” 234 While the prosecution still files a formal
charging document with the court under a DPA, it defers that prosecution
if the firm agrees to perform a variety of actions such as paying substantial
fines, disgorging profits, implementing internal compliance programs,
and cooperating with any ongoing investigations.235 If the organization
satisfactorily performs its duties under the agreement after a period of time
(usually two to four years), the prosecution then dismisses the charges.236
The process of obtaining a settlement under the NPA is similar to that of
a DPA, but without the necessity for a formal court filing. 237 Companies
benefit from settlements because they avoid formal prosecution and the
risks of litigation, while the regulators benefit because settlements
encourage cooperation with investigators.238
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 5–6.
232. See Business Ethics: A Manual for Managing a Responsible Business Enterprise in
Emerging Market Economies, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, http://www.ita.doc.gov/good
governance/business_ethics/manual.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
233. Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife, and the “Culture of
Compliance,” 2012 WIS. L. REV. 689, 697 (2012).
234. Id. at 698–99.
235. Id. at 697.
236. Id.
237. Yockey, supra note 233 (stating that regulators still retain the right to file charges,
but will not do so if the firm complies with the same terms as DPAs).
238. Id. at 698.
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G. Enforcement and Penalties Under the Bribery Act
The U.K. Serious Fraud Office (SFO) is the primary agency that
investigates and prosecutes violations of the Bribery Act.239 The SFO has
issued informative guidance intended to provide insight as to how
prosecutors will decide whether to prosecute a case. 240 The guidance
notes that the Bribery Act focuses on commercial bribery, but also notes
that the Government will gradually shift to combatting international
bribery.241 In deciding whether to prosecute a case, the prosecutor must
consider, first, if there is sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution and,
second, if public interest weighs in favor of prosecution.242
While the SFO has entered settlement agreements in the past with firms,
the judiciary and the OECD have heavily criticized it for doing so. 243
Because of this reaction, the U.K. has been unable to conclude global
settlement agreements in criminal proceedings.244 Nevertheless, in February
2014, the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee added DPA agreements to
the U.K. Criminal Procedure Rules as another method for dealing with
corporate bribery cases.245 Much like the U.S., the U.K. added DPAs to
incentivize cooperation by offering court-sanctioned written settlements
for companies and to avoid the risks inherent in litigation and the
potentially fatal consequences of conviction in criminal courts. 246
Prosecutors now hope that having four High Court judges specially
appointed to deal with DPAs and providing a formal, statutory basis for
DPAs will also encourage resolutions between international investigations.247

239. See Who We Are, Serious Fraud Office, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, http://www.
sfo. gov.uk/about-us/who-we-are.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
240. See U.K. SFO & Crown Prosecution Service, Bribery Act 2010: Joint
Prosecution Guidance of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of
Public Prosecutions, 2, http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/167348/bribery_act_2010_joint_
prosecution_guidance_of_the_director_of_the_serious_fraud_office_and_the_director_of
_public_prosecutions.pdf.
241. Id. at 3.
242. Id. at 4–5.
243. Kevin Roberts & Duncan Grieve, The American Way – DPAs arrive in the U.K.,
MORRISON & FOERSTER, Feb. 6, 2014, at 1–2, http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/
140206-DPAs-UK.pdf (stating that Justice Thomas disapproved of the SFO Director’s
choice to settle with a defendant company); see also Dominic Saglibene, The U.K. Bribery
Act: A Benchmark for Anti-Corruption Reform in the United States, 23 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 134 (2014) (stating that the OECD criticized the SFO for overusing
civil settlements for corporate cases of foreign bribery instead of criminal sanctions).
244. Roberts & Grieve, supra note 243, at 2.
245. See The Criminal Procedure Rules 2014, SI 2014/1610, pt. 12 (Eng. & Wales),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2014/1610/pdfs/uksi_20141610_en.pdf.
246. Roberts & Grieve, supra note 243, at 1.
247. Id.
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H. Recommended Enforcement Procedures in China
Both the U.S. and U.K. have appointed independent agencies to enforce
their anti-corruption laws and maintain a balance between investigating
domestic and foreign entities. While China has appointed the CCDI to
enforce its anti-corruption laws, the CCDI currently has too much power,
conducts highly secretive methods to investigate suspects, and does not
operate independently of the CPC.248 Furthermore, rather than maintaining a
balance between investigating foreign and domestic individuals, China
has committed itself to unprecedented searches of domestic officials,
making the convictions seem more politically motivated.249
China should consider adopting an independent agency in order to
dispense justice fairly and encourage firms to further cooperate with
investigators. Creating a website for the independent investigative agency
similar to that maintained by the DOJ would allow individuals and
companies to inquire about whether certain conduct is punishable by law.
This instrument would not only provide a valuable source of information
of individuals and companies, but also would help articulate and develop
the PRC Criminal Law and AUCL anti-bribery provisions. Additionally,
by publishing select prosecutions and resolutions online, the CPC can
fully explain why it prosecuted certain individuals or companies, thus
bolstering transparency in the anti-corruption framework. The CCDI may
also consider constructing such a website regardless of whether the CPC
establishes an independent agency, in order to fully explain its decisionmaking process and provide guidance on what types of practices are
unacceptable.
Furthermore, China should create an independent judiciary to adjudicate a
fair trial, which will lead to more transparency and effectiveness
in enforcement efforts. Although newly announced reforms will assist in
reducing officials from influencing judicial decisions, it is too early to
determine how effective these measure will be because the CPC has
continued to assert control over the judiciary.250
Currently, criminal charges are the principal means of enforcing anticorruption laws, but China could also benefit from utilizing settlement
agreements as an alternative to prosecution. This would correspondingly
follow Confucian principles of conciliation. By offering DPAs, China can
248.
249.
250.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.C.
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effectively provide companies with an opportunity to comply with anticorruption laws, cooperate with investigators, and facilitate monitoring of
businesses before inevitably resorting to prosecution. This will force the
CPC to provide clear guidelines that will allow companies to implement
suitable compliance programs. Appointing judges specifically charged to
deal with settlements would also allow the judiciary to check the CCDI’s
power. At the very least, the CCDI should follow the DOJ and SFO’s
steps and publish guidance concerning the anti-corruption provisions of
the Criminal Law and AUCL. More defined rules and increased effective
enforcement will encourage more foreign companies to conduct business
in China, thus boosting the economy’s long-term prospects.251
V. OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
The OECD, established in 1961 to promote global economic and social
development, adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention”)
in 1997.252 The convention obliges the parties to criminalize foreign public
official bribery in international business transactions,253 outline criminal
penalties for these violations,254 establish accounting provisions,255 and
provide assistance to other signatories in investigations and proceedings
against those charged with bribery.256 Currently, all 34 OECD members
are parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention as well as seven non-member
countries.257 The OECD Working Group on Bribery, which is comprised
of representatives from each of the member states, supervises the convention.
A. Working Group on Bribery
The Working Group is responsible for monitoring the implementation
of the Anti-Bribery Convention, the 2009 Recommendation of the Council
for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International

251. See supra Part III.B.
252. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Organization for Economic Development, Nov. 21,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention], http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
253. See id. art. 1.
254. See id. art. 3.
255. See id. art. 8.
256. See id. art. 9.
257. See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 21 May 2014, OECD (May
2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf.
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Business Transactions,258 and other related instruments. Its members
meet quarterly to review and monitor implementation of the Anti-Bribery
Convention by member states around the world. Each party undergoes
three phases of periodic peer review. Phase 1 includes an in-depth evaluation
of whether each country’s domestic laws have met the standards set by
the Convention.259 Phase 2 assesses the effectiveness of each country’s
laws and anti-bribery enforcement efforts.260 Phase 3 is a permanent cycle
of peer review that involves a more intensive evaluation of a country’s
enforcement mechanisms than in Phase 2 and also analyzes the country’s
efforts to address weaknesses identified during the Phase 2 review.261 One
of the primary goals of Phase 3 review is to improve anti-bribery efforts
in international business transactions by mutually evaluating parties through
on-site visits and peer pressure.262
The Working Group publishes quarterly country monitoring reports for
each signatory263 and annual reports that explain how each signatory
contributes to the global fight against corruption.264 These official reports
provide an independent evaluation of a country’s enforcement status and
offer data on how effective the convention is in prosecuting individuals
and entities for foreign bribery. 265 Monitoring reports not only allow
reviewing parties to assess and criticize the country under examination,
but also keeps those countries accountable for maintaining and enforcing
foreign bribery provisions. For example, the Working Group constantly
258. See Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY IN
INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, OECD (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/
44176910.pdf.
259. See Phase 1 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/phase1countrymonitoringofthe
oecdanti-briberyconvention.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
260. See Phase 2 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/phase2countrymonitoringofthe
oecdanti-briberyconvention.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
261. See Phase 3 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/phase3countrymonitoringofthe
oecdanti-briberyconvention.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
262. Id.
263. See Country Reports on the Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdantibriberyconvention.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
264. See OECD Working Group on Bribery – Annual Report, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/
tax/crime/oecdworkinggrouponbribery-annualreport.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
265. See id.
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criticized the U.K.’s inadequate anti-bribery laws, forcing it to enact the
Bribery Act to bring its laws into compliance with the Convention in 2008.266
B. Benefits of Joining the OECD Convention
While China is not yet a member of the OECD, it could gain a number
of benefits by joining the OECD Convention. Cooperation with other
signatories and forced peer reviews may encourage other countries to aid
China in fighting corruption in international business transactions.
Although the OECD Convention does not have enforcement powers, peerpressure from other members could influence China to further clarify its
foreign anti-corruption provisions, thus providing more transparency
and guidance for international companies to follow. Peer reviews,
recommendations, follow-ups and critiques from the Working Group
could present effective ideas for implementing new laws and additionally
creates a mechanism that keeps China accountable for its anti-bribery
provisions. Furthermore, receiving recommendations from these reviews
may provide new insight from a different perspective that may garner
more support from the public than policies that are currently in place. The
review and follow-up mechanisms required by the OECD Convention
also offset the absence of any similar processes in the UNCAC.
Conversely, China could potentially learn a lot of valuable information
by conducting peer reviews itself if it joined the OECD Convention.
China’s own Working Group representatives can compare and observe
another country’s practices as well as learn from its experiences in the
quarterly peer review examinations. Moreover, China can study what
practices have and have not worked in other countries, thus saving time
and experimentation costs in creating new national policies. Lastly, both
receiving and providing critiques between countries makes the peer review
process fair and equal because every country undergoes the same type of
scrutiny; thus, China will not feel that it is being singled out for any
shortcomings in its foreign anti-corruption framework.
Truly effective enforcement against corruption in multinational businesses
requires active participation by both local and foreign governments. Thus,
China also needs clearly articulated domestic legislation to discourage
international and domestic businesses from resorting to bribery as a means
of conducting business and to prevent the formation of guanxi relationships
with government officials. By undergoing peer reviews and adopting
recommendations by other OECD signatories, China may be able to
266. Lindsey Hills, Universal Anti-Bribery Legislation Can Save International Business:
A Comparison of the FCPA and the UKBA in an Attempt to Create Universal Legislation
to Combat Bribery Around the Globe, 13 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 469, 472 (2014).
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implement new policies that complement other foreign-reaching statutes
such as the FCPA and UK Bribery Act, thus eliminating the vague laws
currently in place and earning more international support for its policies.
Furthermore, implementing new policies that complement other foreign
statutes could facilitate cooperative foreign investigations and effectively
combat corruption by international businesses. The OECD Convention
encourages its members “to the fullest extent possible under its laws and
relevant treaties and arrangements, provide prompt and effective legal
assistance to another Party.”267 Hence, being a party to the convention will
improve government coordination between countries to continually ensure
that China will receive aid in combatting the supply side of corruption.
Finally, as a member of the G20 and a major economic player in world
trade and investment, China has a responsibility to participate in the OECD
Convention and help other signatories and fellow G20 members combat
the spread of global corruption and promote a fairer global economy.
VI. CONCLUSION
President Xi once said that corrupt behavior, if unaddressed, “will
evolve to be an invisible wall that separates the Party from the people, thus
leaving the Party without root, lifeblood and power.”268 His anti-corruption
campaign remains in full force, but without further systemic change,
public distrust of the CPC will continue to be an issue. Furthermore, while
there are anti-bribery provisions in place, they lack any meaningful legal
effect due to the ambiguous language and powerful CCDI. In order to
develop a truly successful anti-corruption regime, China must increase
transparency, implement strict enforcement mechanisms, and maintain
balance between objectives. Rather than concentrating on deterring public
officials from bribery, it must shift some of its focus to making widespread
changes in order to achieve long-term success. By establishing clear
rules, an independent investigative agency, and an independent judiciary,
the CPC may be able to prove that it is truly seeking institutional change
rather than punishing political rivals and thereby regain the public’s trust.
Some of these recommended changes would require a shift away from
the principle of Party supremacy. While the CPC has recently affirmed
267.
268.

OECD Convention, supra note 252, art. 9.
Lina Yang, Xi Jinping vows “power within cage of regulations,” XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY (Jan. 22, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-01/22/c_132120
363.htm.
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its dominance over the legal system, these shifts demonstrate a necessary
sacrifice in order for China to maintain a steady battle against corruption.
Current measures have been successful in capturing several government
officials and companies. However, many of the campaigns in effect, such
as the anti-extravagance campaign, seem more like symbolic moves that
have only short-term deterrent results that boost the Party’s image.
Developing an independent legal system will expose and investigate corruption
cases without pressure from the CPC, ensure strong enforcement of anticorruption laws, and bring about permanent change.
Due to longstanding historical, cultural, and political traditions, eradicating
corruption in China will be a slow process. Fully stamping out corruption
involves eliminating the conditions that facilitated corruption in the first
place, meaning that changes in traditions are necessary. However, reforming
legislation will yield numerous benefits for China. Clarifying and expanding
upon existing anti-corruption provisions will encourage compliance and
help government officials understand what types of conduct are and are
not permissible. Maintaining a balance between regulating both the supply
and demand side of bribery will also ensure that the burdens placed on
individuals and businesses are not too great and that these burdens will
not hinder economic activity. Moreover, domestic companies will be able
to develop satisfactory internal anti-bribery and accounting procedures,
thus promoting self-regulation and providing a more efficient investigation
process. International businesses that are subject to the FCPA and Bribery
Act and have invested in costly compliance programs will also benefit
because China will provide a similar compliance environment.
These various matters represent some of the issues that surround
China’s developing anti-corruption movement. The battle against bribery
will call upon changes in China’s political, legal, and cultural framework,
but adopting a more effective set of laws and implementing independent
agencies will provide the domestic and international enforcement that China
needs to finally eliminate corruption.
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